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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The review traces the development of EU law in the area of Offshore Safety, through 
the elaboration of the Directive at stake, where the EU authorities claim their ambition 
for preventing major accidents and limiting their consequences. The author highlights 
the practical questions that arise in this regard beyond the EU boundaries and suggests 
possible solutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Commission, where launching the initiative for introducing a “Regulation 
on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities” back 
in 2011, clearly displayed the ambition of further harmonizing European law in the 
offshore industry sector. 
Given that a high share of oil and gas production in Europe takes place offshore, these 
operations are of a crucial interest for attaining European energy security and at the 
same time present the urging need for environmental protection of Community’s waters.  
The European Union’s main challenge is the continual improvement of national law 
enforced by Member States and the enhancement of international regulatory 
framework.  The 2013 Directive’s approval on safety of offshore oil and gas operations 
endorsed the key achievements of the negotiations have taken place at the EU level.   
This Paper shall provide for a close insight of the reflection carried on this topic, where 
thoughts on Safety standards where shared by Offshore Industry’s representatives and 
competent authorities by EU member States and the European Economic Area. The 
European Industry, Research and Energy Committee, as well as the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety Social and Economic and Social Committee joined the 
decision making process and the new legislative proposal was examined by the Council 
of the European Union under its Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
configuration.   
The outcome of this legislative procedure, which held on for two years, has been 
delivered by the adoption of the 2013 Offshore Safety Directive, which takes effect on 
2 
 
July 2015. The general objectives of the EU Directive as flagged under the 2011 
Assessment focus on the prevention of a major incident from occurring and on dealing 
with major emergency through preventive measures.  At the same time, however, the 
objectives of this legal instrument fall beyond the announced assessment.   
The new Directive shall allow those EU Member States, active on the Industry Offshore 
Sector, for adopting high safety standards and best practices as enforced in the North 
Sea.  More, other Member States, prospecting to develop an offshore oil and gas 
industry are required to transpose the Directive norms into national legislation before 
granting licensing for hydrocarbons exploration as well.  This shall not be all.  Currently, 
many Member States, not having developed offshore oil and gas industry and granted 
no licensing for that purpose, have not been involved with this issue.  Against this 
background, the new legislation binds all Member States, called to collaborate for 
addressing questions of coordination between Member States and Third Countries 
where needed and provide appropriate measures for facing major incidents.  Yet, the 
main impact of this legislation derives from its territorial scope.  The Directive covers 
those operations, carried on by European undertakings, beyond EU waters.  Hence, its 
enforcement is ensured by European oil and gas industry where operating in the 
European Economic Area space and more broadly where operating around the globe. 
This thesis’ scope is to address the main developments after the introduction of the new 
legislative instrument in the general normative background.  The Paper is divided in five 
parts, with the first one dealing with the Proposal’s background.  Chapter two sheds 
some light on the principal issues that need to be addressed an the aims of the 
legislation pursued.  The efforts employed for achieving a compromise on the nature of 
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the legal norm to adopt, so as a Directive instead of a Regulation and the substantial 
normative provisions embedded are detailed in the subsequent development.  In 
Chapter 3, the shows how the disparity of legislative instruments in this area of law 
failed providing for a strength response to the risk correlated to accidents incurred in the 
EU waters.     
In terms of understanding the 2013 safety and environmental regime, Chapter 5 
stresses the importance of theoretical framework, risk perspective and decision theories 
under uncertainty, in a joint lecture with an overview of the way the appropriate policy 
option to be adopted at the EU has been prevailed. The identification of the risk, its 
conceptualization encompassing the knowledge dimension and surprises (black swan) 
and the correlation to the EU legislative act are revealed. 
In the Chapter that follows, the author tackles the subject of the liability sharing issue, 
placing emphasis on the new allocation of responsibilities between Member States, 
competent authorities and offshore industry. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concentrates on a Case Study on the Directive’s enforcement, where 
our attention is turned to the identification of those specific aspects of its impact to the 
industry.  The last chapter focuses on the practical aspects related to the monitoring of 
legislative changes by a British Corporation for explaining the UK objections to the 
European initial approach and the consequences of the final act to British Offshore 
industry’s operating model. 
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2.Background 
 
In the following lines, our development describes the needs that justified the 
Commission’s initiative for further harmonizing the EU legislation.  The European 
Commission has been criticized, for excess of competence, as the biggest share of 
offshore activity to regulate takes place outside its territorial waters.  Hence, in this 
Section we assess the main reasons having justified its intervention and provide for the 
key events that leaded to the adoption of the 2013 Directive. 
2.1. Principal issues that need to be addressed and the objectives of the new     
legislation 
 
In October 2011, the European Commission proposed the introduction of a regulation 
on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities. 
The grounds for the proposal were the increasing number of offshore oil and gas 
exploration in complex and geological environments. The Deep Water Horizon Accident 
in 2010 and near misses both within and outside EU territory have exposed 
inadequacies in the current risk-management practices and wide disparities in safety 
performance and attitudes. Additionally, the accidents have shown an absence of 
transparency and data sharing regarding safety performance and have highlighted the 
challenges that regulators face in ensuring sufficient oversight of offshore activities. 
Therefore, the need to reduce the probability of a major accident is needed in an effort 
to protect the environment, local communities, the society, the life and health of workers 
and to prevent material losses. The principal issues as defined in the EU Impact 
Assessment (I.A) [3] that needed to be addressed are: 
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- the significantly high risk of a major offshore accident 
- the inability of  legislation, regulatory and industry practices to provide effective 
emergency response to accidents and the lack of clarity for liabilities for clean-up 
and conventional damages 
 
Consequently, the EU set as general objectives for this initiative to reduce the risks of 
major accident in EU waters and to limit the consequences in the unfortunate event that 
such an accident takes place. 
 
The above can be developed in four specific objectives: 
- to ensure a consistent use of best practices for major hazards control by offshore 
operations in EU waters 
- to implement best regulatory practices in all European jurisdictions 
- to improve and clarify the existing EU liability and compensation provisions 
- to strengthen EU preparedness and response capacity [I.A. 3.2] 
 
2.2. A brief introductory chronological summary of the main events; from 
inception to implementation of the new legislation 
 
Following the Montara blowout in Australia in 2009 and the Deep Water Horizon 
incident in April 2010, the European Union became aware of the lack of a legislation 
specifically targeting offshore oil and gas operations. Later that year, the EU 
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commission recommended several changes to the current regime such as the 
reinforcement of exploration licensing regimes and a review of regulatory approaches 
and the improvement of EU oil spill response. The commission moved on to investigate 
its own role in offshore safety, to stress the need of reviewing the certification regime for 
offshore equipment and to strengthen the role for regulatory and verification bodies. 
 Therefore, in October 2011 the European commission proposed a new legislation to 
deal with offshore oil and gas safety. The initial proposal was that the legislation would 
take the form of a regulation, meaning that would have direct applications in EU 
member states. This was objected by the UK authorities since it raised concern for a 
potential unnecessary change to the UK regime to the extent there were inconsistencies 
between the Regulation and UK legislation. An alternative option, would be the form of a 
Directive, which set out general rules to be transferred into national law by each country 
as they deem appropriate. A Directive gives member states more flexibility on how the 
new requirements are implemented. [4]  
A year later, having taken the UK suggestion under consideration, the EU Parliament 
decided to draft a Directive whose objectives are to achieve consistent use of Best 
Practices for major Hazards control, implement best regulatory practices in all European 
jurisdictions, strengthen EU’s preparedness and response for offshore emergencies and 
clarify EU liability and compensation provisions. [5] 
On the 18th of July 2013, the directive is officially approved as a European Union law, to 
which member states have to transpose to by July 2015. There exist however, some 
transitional provisions. For existing installations the transition can be postponed until 
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July 2018. In planned production installations and operators planning or executing well 
operations, the transitional period extents to July 2016.  
The new directive is not applicable to onshore installations, but is set to cover all types 
of offshore installations. Onshore installations will be covered by 92/91/EEC directive. 
Having said that, we have gained some more understanding on the reasons, which 
motivated the EU Commission to proceed with this project, the difficulties faced and the 
core elements of its way, the Commission has approached this issue
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3. Existing Legislation 
 
In the subsequent paragraph, our interest zooms on the existing legal framework at the 
time the Commission has launched its legislative initiative.  This section asserts the 
reasons for legitimazing the introduction of a specific legal instrument in respect of the 
principle of necessity that attributes competence to the EU for proceeding with new 
legislation.  Under the Treaties, the Commission must justify for which reasons further 
legislation is needed and shall abstain from legislating where this is not absolutely 
necessary, proportionate to the needs identified and appropriate.  Hence, this Section’s 
goal is to discuss on the disparity of legal instruments in this area and the missing 
nexus, so as, the introduction of a conceptualized theory that embraces the diverse 
normative instruments for obtaining an overall coherent legal frame. 
 
3.1.Disparity of legal instruments 
. 
The European Union has already established several legislations aiming to accomplish 
those objectives, but there is no legislation targeting specifically the offshore sector. In 
addition, existing legislations can be subjected to improvements. Member states’ laws 
are inconsistent and there is a lack of clarity on laws regarding licensing, public 
transparency, and information sharing and liability provisions. The new legislation aims 
to compliment the already in effect legislations such as: [34] 
 
Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) 2004/35/EC 
This directive aims to protect from damages to the environment, protected species, 
natural habitats or water and dictates that the operator is responsible for preventing and 
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remedying any damage and to cover the full costs of it. However, this Directive is limited 
to coasted strips and does not cover all waters under EU jurisdiction. 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment: Directive 85/337/EEC 
This directive aims to assess the effects of operations to the environment by setting 
general minimum requirements. 
 
 
 
Waste law: Directive 2008/98/EC 
This directive applies fully to oil spills, and imposes the obligation to the polluter to bear 
the responsibility and cost for cleaning the polluted area. 
 
Health and safety of workers at work: - Directive 92/91/EEC 
This Directive concerns the protection and working environment of offshore workers.  
The new legislation improves the provisions of Directive 92/91/EEC by introducing an 
environmental assessment, by establishing a notification scheme for well operations 
and by the introduction of independent verification requirement. 
 
Major hazards: The Seveso Directive 96/82/EC 
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The Seveso Directive does not apply on offshore projects. It also fails to include 
important aspects that are covered by the new Directive such as requiring the regulators 
consent for risk assessment and provisions for evacuation escape and rescue 
personnel. The Member State will require verification of the technical competence of the 
operator which the licensee choses to run the operations. Both the competence and the 
financial capability to cover liability costs should be assessed early during licensing 
stages. 
The Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) and Safety Management System (SMS), 
both elements of the Seveso Directive are also included in the provisions of the new 
Offshore Safety Directive (2013/30/EU).  
A new Seveso Directive 2012/18/EU was adopted in 2012 which repeals the Seveso 
96/82/EC. 
 
Granting hydrocarbon prospection, exploration and production authorizations: 
Directive 94/22/EC 
This directive have direct relation with the provisions that are missing by the Seveso 
Directive 96/82/EC and it should be considered in order to further strengthen the 
obligations of the Member States’ authorities and achieve the desired improvement in 
evaluating the competence of the applicants. 
 
Emergency Response tools:  
i. EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Council Decision 2007/779/EC) 
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ii. the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) 
iii. the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
 
The new Directive aims to utilize the above tools to improve emergency response. 
EMSA’s primary focus was initially on maritime shipping; however its competence has 
already been expanded to cover accidents on offshore installations.  
 
3.2.Seeking for the missing nexus 
 
The introduction of a new legal instrument in the area of Offshore Safety has a 
multidimensional value.  This holds true, since the new normative instrument shall be 
elaborated in consistency with other norms, regulating this area of law, which are 
already implemented.  In such circumstances, the main objective of the establishment of 
a specific legal framework is to achieve a better visibility of the rules addressed to the 
offshore industry, while enforcing the regulatory frame and enhancing cooperation of the 
private actors with independent authorities. 
In this sense, it is of a high interest to establish a global and understandable 
memorandum, which provides for a better overall view of duties, responsibilities and 
liabilities borne by the undertakings acting in this sector and the authorities involved.  
The main challenge for the EU services is the setting up of a coherent and consistent 
legal framework where the specificities of the provisions taken do not undermine the 
generality of the rules to apply.   
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Hence, for succeeding the drafting of such legislation, the European authorities need to 
rely on a solid theoretical background, which provides the ground for the elaboration of 
these norms.   
In the following section our interest shifts to this theoretical background, which 
combines elements of the principle of competence attributed to the EU, of the objectives 
to pursue under the Treaties and of general axiom found in literature of risk 
management. 
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4. The 2013 EU Directive 
 
In this Section, we depart from the concept of risks and the identification of the meaning 
to entail to the precautionary principle in order to trace the link between these prongs.  
The main goal of this description is to assert the different methods of evaluating the risk 
and elaborate the preventive measures to tackle it, embedded in the meaning of the risk 
acceptance criteria. 
 
4.1. Theoretical Background 
 
With more than 10 major disasters in the industry the past 35 years [7] and many more 
near misses (Gullfaks C installation in Norway, BP Forties Alpha platform in the UK) the 
need to further reduce the risks posed by offshore operations in EU waters is 
distinguishable. Even in countries where robust legislation has been introduced 
following major accidents such as UK (Piper Alpha) and Norway (Alexander Kielland), 
the risk for a major accident is reduced but is it still considered high. The Norwegian 
Petroleum Safety Authority has published a study of trends in risk level in the 
Norwegian petroleum activity (RNNP) which shows a sharp rise in well control incidents 
and gas leaks back at a high level [8].  
The past experiences have shown that the EU needs to address the following 3 major 
problem in the industry: 
 
The increasing risk of major offshore oil and gas accidents 
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- The current regulatory framework and operating arrangements do not provide for the 
most effective response to all consequences of accidents in EU waters 
- Under existing liability regimes, the responsible party may not always be clearly 
identifiable and/or may not be able, or liable, to pay all the costs of remedy of the 
damage caused by its action. 
The majority of offshore installations in EU waters are in the North Sea, including 
Norway where many EU based operators are active. In the region the operations are 
run under the more successful goal setting regulatory approach. However, the 
increasing number of oil wells and oil installations indicates that even in this region 
some problems need to be addressed. [I.A. 2.1] 
 
4.1.1. The “Precautionary” and “polluter pays” Principle: the environmental 
standard measure 
 
For the new Directive to be consistent with other EU policies, it must amongst other be 
consistent with the precautionary principle and the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle.  
 
These two policies are two very basic principles of environmental protection which are 
accepted since April 2004 on a European level legal standard [9]. 
 
The precautionary principle as defined by the 1992 Rio Declaration states that: 
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“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost‐effective measures to prevent environmental degradation“. 
 
At this point, it is relevant to point out that “‘the implementation of the precautionary 
principle could result in increasing costs, delayed innovation and negatively affect the 
viability of innovative industries and those that depend on their products. A strong 
version of the precautionary principle justify or require precautionary measures and 
some also establish liability for the possible harm, which is effectively a strong form of 
polluter pays” [1]. According to Cameron (2006), ‘‘this may encourage these industries 
to change their activities or relocate to other jurisdictions with less stringent standards of 
proof, resulting in a loss in capability in the home country’’. This cannot be argued, 
however, since the new Directive requires EU based companies to implement its 
provisions even when operating in waters outside EU jurisdiction and regularly report on 
accidents and near misses. 
An essential theme of the Precautionary principle is that decision making under extreme 
uncertainty and ignorance is a matter of policy and political considerations. Science can 
inform the decision but cannot resolve difficult issuers over cause and effect. Thus, a 
decision for further study or not to do anything in the face of uncertainty is a policy 
decision not a scientific one just as taking preventive action would be. The legislation 
needs to include certain components in order to be in accordance to the principle: [10] 
- Take precautionary action before scientific certainty of cause and effect 
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- Plan based on well-defined goals rather than on future scenarios and risk calculations 
- Seek out and evaluate alternatives to reduce or eliminate the hazard and consider all 
possible means of achieving that goal 
- Those who have the power, control, and resources to act and prevent harm should 
bear the responsibility of any harm to human nature or to the environment.  
- Develop more democratic and thorough decision-making criteria and methods by a 
new way of thinking about decisions and weighing scientific and other evidence in the 
face of uncertainty. 
 
4.1.2. Risk Perspectives and decision theories under uncertainty 
In this context, Tickner (2004)[10] further explore what is meant by the term uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can take many forms. Some kinds can be addressed and reduced while 
others cannot. The most widely recognized types of uncertainty include: 
 
- Parameter uncertainty 
It refers to missing or ambiguous information in specific informational components of an 
analysis. The EU through the legislation intends to improve methods of collecting and 
analyzing information and takes measures to improve transparency and sharing of 
information (Article 23) 
 
- Model uncertainty 
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Model uncertainty refers to information gaps that can compromise the validity of the 
model where not enough information are available to construct a complete model.  
 
 
- Epistemic uncertainty 
Can be defined as “the lack of knowledge about fundamental phenomena, that is, about 
the true outcome distribution” [11]. 
 
- Aleatory uncertainty 
This can defined as the variation in outcomes or populations. It is often also referred to 
as “stochastic uncertainties” and “randomness” [11]. 
 
- Politically induced uncertainty 
This can occur when the agencies intentionally refrains from studying a hazard, limit the 
scope of its analysis or hide uncertainty in quantitative models. 
 
4.1.3. New Risk Perspectives 
To compose an appropriate legislation concerning the safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations, a correct approach to the concept of risk is essential. The description of risk 
one of the fundamental steps in performing a risk analysis, along with cause and 
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consequence analysis and the identification of the sources of risk [Error! Reference 
source not found.]. 
Historically, risk has been considered as expected loss along with its probabilities. This 
probability based perspective is nowadays considered by many obsolete and it is 
argued they should be replaced by broader risk perspectives which are not confined to 
a specific measure of uncertainty, in this case probability. In other words, (Aven, 2004) 
“The (lack of) knowledge dimension captures for example that probability, used as a 
measure of uncertainty or degree of belief, is not able to reflect the strength of the 
knowledge that the probabilities are based on, and not that assumptions that the 
probabilistic analysis is built on could conceal important aspects of uncertainties”. These 
probability based risk perspectives have the need of supplementary characterizations 
which can offer further understanding about knowledge and lack of it, as well as 
potential surprises. The basic features of these new risk perspectives are [Error! 
Reference source not found.]: 
 Probability-based thinking  
 Knowledge dimension  
 Surprises (black swan)  
 
4.1.4. Assessing the Strength of knowledge  
Strength of knowledge is hard to define which makes it difficult for the decision maker 
since the uncertainty interval he is given does not express the strength of knowledge. 
Aven [15] suggests two methods to assess the strength of knowledge. 
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The first method is based on grading the strength of knowledge of the probabilistic 
analysis. Flage and Aven [14] propose a scoring system where knowledge is described 
as low, medium or high. 
The second method captures the basic features of the risk description of the new risk 
perspectives. It aims to produce a set of uncertainty factors by identifying all the main 
assumptions the analysis is based on. These factors represent to which degree 
historical data are representative for the future. This “assumption deviation risk” concept 
is considered to be more precise compared to previously used concepts such as 
“degree of uncertainty” and sensitivity [12]. 
 
4.1.5. Black Swans  
Major accidents with severe consequences are rare, and in most cases unique and the 
result of a combination of highly unlikely to occur events. Since the EU policy aims to 
primarily prevent these sort of accidents from occurring, it is relevant to examine the 
nature of such events, also known as black swans. 
 
 The concept of black swans was first mentioned by Nassim Nichola Taleb in 2001 
where he defines it as “a phenomenon which involves highly improbable events, thus 
almost impossible to anticipate, that inflict disproportionate influence” [16]. These events 
can be accidental or intentional.  
 
According to Aven, black swans can be grouped in two categories:  
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I. “Unknown unknowns in the strict sense, meaning that these events are not 
known to the scientific community”. 
II. “Surprises compared to the produced risk picture, i.e. surprises compared to 
the beliefs of the experts and analysts involved in the assessment” (15, 
p.140)”. 
To asses black swans, a list of events which match the description of a black swan is 
produced, followed by a review of all possible arguments and evidence for the 
occurrence of such events. 
 
4.1.6. Risk acceptance Criteria 
The EU intention is to compose the legislation based on the example set by the North 
Sea Offshore Authorities. The Use of Risk Acceptance Criteria is a common practice for 
these states. 
Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) are frequently used worldwide in many industries. 
These criteria allow the authorities or whoever adopts them to detect activities with high 
level of risk for the society or an individual. Their goal is to ensure that the level of risk is 
acceptable with respect to safety, cost and the environment and to balance and 
compare risk against the benefits. They are defined by NORSOK as “criteria that are 
used to express a risk level that is considered as the upper limit for the activity in 
question to be tolerable” [17, 3.1.52] 
RAC can be defined by two different methods, implicitly and explicitly. These methods 
are adopted by international authorities such as the JCSS and reputable local 
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authorities such as the British Project Management Institute (PMI) and the Association 
for Project Management (APM). [18]  
Implicit RAC was the first method that was used in the offshore industry. In the past, 
industries in an effort to introduce quantitative risk criteria sought guidance from 
industries which had already developed risk acceptance criteria, such as the nuclear 
sector. It was based on aiming for equal safety with the initial industry sector who 
developed these quantitative risk criteria that address on the general decisions that can 
affect the structure, scope, context and content of the project [18].  
The common way of defining criteria in industries nowadays is the explicit method. 
Explicit risk management deals with individual project risks through the standard risk 
process. It can be defined as “a quantitative decision tool to the regulator or a 
comparable requirement for the industry when dealing with the certification / approval of 
a particular structure or system” [19]. 
After having spelled that, we shall exam the basic principles for establishing RAC. 
Using absolute risk criteria: 
These tools are used by the decision maker uses evaluate risk. They can take the form of 
individual risk, societal risk, fatal accident rate (FAR) etc. F-N curves represent the 
function between the number of fatalities and accidents and can prove a good indicator 
for evaluating societal risks. Risk can be expressed in risk acceptability matrices or 
based on hazard severity levels. 
The ALARP principle: 
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 Another widely used principle for determining criteria for acceptable risks is the ALARP 
principle (as low as reasonably practicable). The principle is commonly adopted by 
regimes in the North Sea region. According to the UK legal regime, “the ALARP 
evaluation implies that identified improvements (risk reducing measures) should be 
implemented as a base case, unless it can be demonstrated that the benefits are 
grossly disproportionate to the costs and operational restrictions. This principle is 
normally applied together with a limit for intolerable risk and a limit for negligible risk. 
The interval between these two limits is often called the ALARP region.” [20] 
The new Directive requires that the operator uses to the ALARP Principle for reducing 
the risk of Major Accidents (Preamble 14): 
‘’Operators should reduce the risk of a major accident as low as reasonably practicable, 
to the point where the cost of further risk reduction would be grossly disproportionate to 
the benefits of such reduction. The reasonable practicability of risk reduction measures 
should be kept under review in the light of new knowledge and technology 
developments. In assessing whether the time, cost and effort would be grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits of further reducing the risk, regard should be had to best 
practice risk levels compatible with the operations being conducted’’. 
Combining the ALARP method with tools mentioned earlier such as F-n or Risk 
Acceptability matrices the decision maker is able to weigh a risk against the effort, time 
and money needed to control it. 
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Figure 1: Use of ALARP in F-N Diagram [21]                              Figure 2: ALARP Principle according to NORSOK Z-013 [17] 
 
 
The use of RAC provides many benefits to the industry. It allows the decision-maker to 
know when the risk is low enough to be acceptable and allows the companies to 
express their own criteria by concrete statement; making it easier for company 
personnel to comply therefore the management does not need to be involved very 
often. The quantitative risk assessment (QRA) takes into consideration multiple 
scenarios that involve all potential failures and provides a thorough evaluation of the 
system. On the other hand, the used of predefined RAC has some limitations. The focus 
can be on showing that the risk is below this criterion, and potential risk-reducing 
measures might be overlooked. The QRA relies heavily on historical data and the 
appropriate value of RAC is hard to be defined. Companies have the opportunity to 
manipulate these assumptions and premises in an unethical manner. 
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 The use of RAC has also been proven to be inconsistent with expected utility theory 
and rank dependent utility theory [22]. 
Having said that, we shall dedicate some lines to the risk acceptance criteria set and the 
instance which shall be the author of the elaboration of the rules to apply, so as the 
Industry of the Authorities. 
Risk Acceptance Criteria set by the Industry or the Authorities 
Risk acceptance criteria are not used in the same way throughout the North Sea 
regimes. In Norway, it is not a common practice for the authorities to formulate risk 
acceptance criteria to be used by the industry; however the Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA) has influenced oil companies to the extent that risk acceptance criteria used are 
fairly similar [23]. The Norwegian regime, based on internal control relies on the industry 
to set the upper limits of what can be defined as acceptable risk. This contradicts the 
practice of other regimes in the region such as the UK and Netherlands. According to 
Abrahamsen and Aven [22], based on expected utility theory, in general risk acceptance 
criteria should, from a decision point of view, be set by the authorities. With a more 
practical point of view Vinnem [23] using a past case as example, argues than in 
practice it is difficult to get the operators to set the criteria themselves. 
 
4.1.7. State-of-the-Art / Best Practice approach 
Best practice:  
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This approach is not strictly a risk analysis method. The underlying philosophy is that the 
necessary safety measures must be in place to protect the population against the ‘worst case’ 
accident. This means that the establishment needs to have considered the consequences of 
these worst-case accidents, and taken the necessary preventative and accident-limiting steps, 
such that the risk outside the establishment’s fence is negligible (‘zero-risk principle’). However, it 
is recognised that it will not always be possible to limit accidents to the establishment’s own property, 
and therefore safety zones are laid out, based on an assessment of typical (not necessarily the worst 
credible) accident scenarios [24]. 
 
                Figure 3: Best practices that are recommended for Project Risk Management [26]. 
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4.2. Selecting the appropriate Policy Option  
 
In this Section our interest is focus on the ascertainment of the alternative options the 
EU had at its disposal, where a decision had to be made on resolving the issue at stake.  
The three-prong problem, related to the risk of a major offshore oil accident, the 
ineffectiveness of the responses provided to all consequences of accidents and the 
non-identification of responsibility and liability of the party having caused the accident, 
has brought the EU to act by new legislation. 
In the following lines, the author describes, at a first page, the different policy options.  
Their description shall allow us to gain a better understanding of how these policies 
address, on the one hand, reducing the probability of an accident and mitigating the 
consequences where such an accident is produced.  On the other hand, we assess the 
financial and administrative impact of each policy on the costs of offshore accidents in 
terms of protection of human life, of involvement of local society in decision-making, 
acknowledged as major stakeholder and environmental protection.   
In this stage of elaboration of EU law, the discussion launched revealed a lot of 
controversy.  That was the case, although the majority of stakeholders agreed on the 
need for introducing tighter measures for preventing and responding to major accidents. 
Against this background, non-governmental organizations were supporting changes at 
Union level, while authorities in the North Sea advised otherwise.  The latter expressed 
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concerns, related to the setting of regulatory approaches, intended to be promoted by 
the new legislation, as they differentiate from their normative approach, based upon the 
building up of “goals to be achieved”. 
Depending on the desired degree of change in offshore practices, the EU developed 
five possible policy options. Each policy option consists of a package of measures that 
will act upon the drivers of the problem.  For doing so, the European Commission, 
based on industry performance analysis and on documented costs of past accidents, 
the estimated average annual economic losses and damage from offshore oil and gas 
accidents in EU range from €205 million to €915 million (I.A, 2.4.2). In the impact 
assessment, this scenario was used as the empirical baseline risk, for evaluating the 
different options.  The outcome of this comparison permitted to conclude for the option 
to be retained.   
The EU fixes as a main goal the achievement of a number of aims to be fulfilled by the 
implementation of a pledge of measures.  In the subsequent development, our paper 
presents the measures identified.  These measures shall be studied more exhaustively 
in other parts of the paper.  At this stage of our analysis, our focus is restricted in the 
simple presentation of the measures, as they stand for a benchmark against which each 
of the policies is tested.  The Commission’s reasoning consists into evaluating every 
policy option in accordance to the measures selected in order to assert the best policy 
option to be retained. 
The measures go as following [12]: 
 Detailed verification of the technical capacity of potential operator 
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 Establishing regular inspections and a penalties Regime 
 Submission of formal safety assessments for acceptance by the regulator 
 Extension of MHR into a comprehensive risk management model 
 Extending EU practices to overseas operations 
 Establishing a Competent Authority 
 Establishing a platform for regulatory dialogue 
 Comprehensive information sharing and Transparency 
 Preparedness for effective emergency response to major offshore accidents 
 Ensuring cross-border availability and compatibility of intervention assets 
 Clarifying the scope of environmental liability 
 
Having said that, we shall overview the five different options (0-3) provided under the 
Impact Assessment, provide for the description and the results of their evaluation 
against the measures prescribed.   
The Option 0 reflects the actual status quo.  As the Commission’s experts underline, 
this baseline scenario does not satisfy any of the measures setting up the benchmark 
as overseen above.  It goes without saying that the EU recognizes that the non-
introduction of a new legal instrument does not allow to evolve towards the satisfaction 
of any of these criteria set down.  Nevertheless, the Commission notes that “how 
measures may be progressively implemented to achieve higher levels of policy options” 
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[12].  Therefore, the baseline scenario figures the crucial need for moving on with the 
elaboration of a new public policy, rather than stands as a possibility of option itself. 
The Option 1, labeled as the “North Sea practice Basic”, is modeled after what is known 
in the Nordic and British legislation, establishing a “risk based” approached.  Although 
this scenario is recognized as “among the very best of the world” [12], transposing this 
scenario in the EU legislation does not allow to override insufficiencies of this legislation 
as reported from North Sea Member States.  Consequently, it has been ascertained 
that, although regional disparities would no more persist, “a higher common 
denominator” in the EU” would not be obtained [12].  As far as concerning the measures 
satisfied under the implementation of Option 1, we shall retain that two of them are 
fulfilled, so as the Submission of formal safety assessments for acceptance by the 
regulator prior to operations with major hazards potential and the establishing of regular 
inspections and a penalties regime [12].   
Moving on to “Option 1+, “reported as “North Sea model”, recalls what has been 
described in the previous scenario.  Two key issues are to be reported.  The first core 
element on which the EU experts have contemplate is related to the improvement of the 
current legislation of North Sea countries, through the introduction of provisions already 
implemented in the EU, but dispersed in the various legal instruments overviewed in the 
previous section.  Hence, it is admitted that the all over coherence and visibility of the 
EU legal framework shall not gained much under this scenario.  Going through the 
measures satisfied, so as the “Detailed verification of the technical capacity of potential 
operator, the clarifying the applicability of waste legislation in the scope of 
environmental Liability, the preparedness for effective emergency response to major 
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offshore accidents, the ensuring cross-border availability and compatibility of 
intervention assets, the extending EU practices to overseas operations”, we shall reflect 
on the overall standard of regulation to be respected provided the EU has opted for this 
scenario.  What it clearly comes out is the differentiation of standards applied to EU 
undertakings, acting beyond the EU boundaries, bound by the EU legislation and the 
third countries business actors, carrying on business outside the EU.   These two 
categories of undertakings shall be in a differentiated situation, where EU business 
would have to comply with some more obligations compared to a third country business, 
due to the extension of EU legislation beyond its boundaries.  More, we shall reflect 
whether these measures are similar to the ones reported by Nord Sea authorities as 
areas of improvement for national law [13].  These measures may to some extent 
satisfy concerns expressed from Norwegian authorities related to the major accident 
risk indicator, which is not improving, despite the organization efforts undertaken, for 
addressing technical issues.  Three key figures that attract Norwegian authorities 
attention are hydrocarbon leaks; well control incidents and personal injuries.  Since EU 
law covers the Norwegian industry, as far as concerning the activity of EU business 
actors within their jurisdiction. 
Policy Option 2, named after as” EU best practice model”, is the one where the EU 
assumes the most the necessity of introducing new pieces of legislation in this area.  It 
has the merit of having a broad scope of intervention, encompassing areas such as the 
industry culture, the reliability of systems and transparency.  What distinguishes Option 
2 from the previous scenario descripted is the methodological approach for setting up 
the legislation.  Within this scenario, the “exemplary and proves practices” stand as a 
31 
 
model for producing rules to respect, where the legislator eschew the transposition of 
norms, preferring instead, working on “business models”.  The measures satisfied under 
this scenario are the “Extension of formal safety assessments in view of creating a 
comprehensive risk management model for EU offshore, establishing a Competent 
Authority in each jurisdiction, establishing a platform for regulatory dialogue and 
information sharing amongst jurisdictions, the preparedness for effective emergency 
response to major offshore accidents, ensuring cross-border availability and 
compatibility of intervention assets, clarifying fully the scope of environmental liability, 
the comprehensive information sharing and transparency” [12].  What shall be retained 
is that Option 2 has the merit of promoting the “major hazard risk model”, associated 
with EU sensibilities to environmental aspects.  The model was the more desirable for 
the European experts, since it allows gaining “transparence of performance of industry 
and regulators”, without introducing an unaffordable administrative burden on public 
authorities and industry players.  What has been emphasized is that Option 2 does 
provide for reducing the risk of incidents considerably where enhances the legal 
framework for tacking probabilities of incidents to incur and mitigating its consequences. 
Shifting to Option 3, we briefly describe the “EU Agency model” that, as its name 
reveals, calls into for the necessity of the instauration of an EU body.  Compared to 
other Options, the respect and fulfilled of measures described, is mostly satisfied under 
this scenario.  The centralization of the action of the authorities and the harmonization 
of the implementing measures would allow gaining best results.  As such, the measures 
satisfied and listed are verification of operators technical capacity, regular inspections 
and penalties regime, submission of formal safety assessments for acceptance by the 
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regulator, extending EU practices to overseas operations, establishing a competent 
authority, establishing a platform for regulatory dialogue, the preparedness for 
emergency response, the cross border availability of compatible assets and clarifying 
the scope of environmental liability [12]. 
At this stage of our development, we shall recall that the main objective of any policy 
action is the reduction risk of accidents and avoidance of human, environmental and 
economic losses.  Keeping this in mind, we shall proceed with some final comments on 
each of the options, which have determinate the final option retained by the EU. 
Hence, the Option O is disregarded, since it relies on EU Member States and industries 
good faith for enhancing innovation and upgrading national legislation, where the EU 
does not contribute to the achievement of this goal [12]. 
While EU discussed Option 1, they have recognized that a partial improvement of the 
safety cultural of the industry could be gained, where the institutionalization of groups of 
industry players, sharing knowledge on the topic, would permit national authorities to 
permit their selves imposing more inspection and penalties [12]. 
Option 1 + has been critically reviewed.  This scenario does not improve technical 
aspects of the current legislation as much as it was wished.  It has been admitted that it 
does clarify issues related to the liability where accidents occur, which influences the 
moral hazard risk.  A second element of positive evaluation was the development of 
cross-border plans for common action in the offshore Safety area.  The measures as 
described are in most cases not satisfied under this scenario.  On the overall, this 
scenario, did gain the highest political support, where debated at the EU Council.  It has 
the advantage of not intruding norms in national legislations which would affect the 
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clarity and comprehensiveness of rules implemented under the British legal frame.  
Consequently, the final text adopted is a Directive instead of a Regulation, adoption 
Option 1+, which does not intervene in matters of legal definitions and qualifications that 
would undermine the efficiency of the British legislation. 
Option 2, although it figured as a good finalist candidate, was dismissed in the political 
arena.  It called the ambition of “The enhanced sector culture renders an improvement 
in verifying technical capacity during licensing. The EU Offshore Authorities Group is 
established under EC auspices to the benefit of all MS, equally, and supported by 
obligatory standard reporting for the first time across any national borders” [12].  Yet, 
not all EU Member States where willing to proceed on this trend.  Hence, the UK 
reticence for introducing reforms which would incur the risk of jeopardizing the 
application of the British legislation, in this area of law [14] “Whilst we support the 
drive/desire for continual improvement of national and international regulatory 
frameworks, our overriding concern is that the proposed Regulation will have an 
immediate detrimental impact on safety standards in the UK offshore oil and gas 
industry and, longer term, will provide no significant improvement in overall standards.” 
Lastly, Option 3 was put aside, due to the high cost of its implementation.   In any case, 
its adoption would only make sense, if Option 2 were opted.  The introduction of an EU 
Agency was foreseeable for enhancing the implementation of common standards as 
described under Option 2.  In accordance to what has been said previously, the 
discussion on Option 3 turns short. More, what has been underlined in respect of Option 
3 is that “the introduction of an EU Agency has a destabilizing effect on existing mature 
regimes, especially in the North Sea and Italy, leading to a reduction in benefits 
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accruing to option 2 in respect of MS regulatory efficacy and though that on the safety 
culture of the industry” [12].  
 
 
As the above table indicates, Option 2 can reduce the baseline risk (€ 205-915m) of 
offshore incidents in EU waters by (50%) expressed both in terms of likelihood and 
consequence of occurrence. Additionally, it introduces the major hazard risk model 
Table 1: Risk Reduction, cost and Regulatory Impacts of Proposed Policies [2] 
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enhanced with the environmental aspects – a priority element of the EU initiative [I.A. 
7.1]. 
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5. The liability sharing issue 
 
One of the main achievements of the Directive at stake is the providing more clarity and 
legibility of the allocation and repartition of liabilities between the industry and the 
competent authorities, where it comes to the supervising of the risk and the 
consequences where an accident occurs.   
This justifies why the European Union extends its competence to areas beyond its 
boundaries, taking into consideration that industry shall be kept liable for its operating 
model and provide information to European authorities of proven evidence of its 
capacity to operate in difficult conditions, such as those of the Artic areas.   
Our development describes firstly, those obligations borne by the industry and the ones 
binding the States. 
 
5.1. Obligations to the industry 
 
The licensee is now required to demonstrate their technical and financial capacity 
beginning at licensing stage and throughout the lifecycle of operations. In case of 
environmental damage, the licensee bears the full liability, regardless if it was caused 
by the licensee or the operator (Article 7)  
Major Hazards Reports must be accepted by the regulator before operations initiate and 
must now include major environmental consequences as well as safety.  
In the event of a major accident, the operator or the owner must take all suitable 
measures to prevent its escalation and to limit its consequences and all installations 
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must have an emergency response plan for immediate response to major accidents. 
Companies are required to report on accidents on their installations even if the accident 
occurred outside the EU waters. 
Following the lessons learned from the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, 
the EU takes a series of measures to improve safety in well operations.  According to 
the principle laying down in article 15§3 of the Directive as adopted: 
Member States shall ensure that the operator of a well prepares the notification to be 
submitted before starting well operations.  Member States shall ensure that the operator 
of the well involves the independent verifier in planning and preparation of a material 
change to the submitted notification of well operations immediately informs the 
competent authority of any material change to the submitted notification of well 
operation [15]. 
The directive sets as minimum safety standards for all member states to require by the 
operator to bear responsibility to ensure that all suitable measures are taken to prevent 
any major accidents, including the escape of hydrocarbons to the environment. Member 
states are required by the Directive to impose specific requirements to the companies 
operating within their jurisdiction. These include the assessment of the technical and 
financial capabilities of the operators in order to ensure that they are able to cover 
potential liabilities that can arise by their operations. Furthermore, the operator must be 
approved by the licensing authority and submit to the competent authority a number of 
documents including: (Article 11) 
- A corporate major accident prevention policy 
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- A safety and environmental management system applicable to relevant installation 
- A report on major hazard and an emergency response plan 
Operators and owners are required to inform their employees and contractors about the 
confidential reporting mechanism (article 22) and ensure this is included in relevant 
training and notices. 
 
Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) and Safety & Environmental Management 
System (SEMS) 
Another important characteristic of this new directive is that it covers operations 
conducted by EU headquartered operators both within and outside EU waters, in 
accordance to Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) and Safety & Environmental 
Management System (SEMS). 
SEMS is a nontraditional, performance-focused tool for integrating and managing 
offshore operations. The purpose of SEMS is to enhance the safety of operations by 
reducing the frequency and severity of accidents [32]. It is part of the overall 
Management System and includes the organizational structure, responsibilities, 
practices, procedures, processes and resources for determining and implementing the 
MAPP [33]. 
The MAPP aims to achieve plant safety and ensure high Level of Protection for man 
and environment by setting the responsibility at corporate board level for ensuring on a 
continuous basis that the major accident prevention policy is suitable, implemented, and 
operating as intended. It is a formal document which applies for all establishments and 
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should include the operator’s overall aims and principles of action with respect to the 
control of major accident hazards. [5] According to the new Seveso Directive 
(2012/18/EU), for the purpose of implementing the operator’s safety management 
system, account shall be taken of the following elements [31]: 
- The safety management system shall be proportionate to the hazards 
- Organization structure and personnel roles and responsibilities;  
- Identification and evaluation of major hazards 
- Controls of the major hazards during normal operations;  
- Management of change; adoption and implementation of procedures for planning -
modifications to, or the design of new installations, processes or storage facilities -
planning for emergencies and response 
- Monitoring of performance  
- Audit and review 
We now shift to the obligations of the Member States. 
 
5.2. Obligations to the Member States 
 
Member states should examine the technical and financial liability of the licensee before 
permit is given to commence operations. When assessing the financial capability of 
entities applying for authorization, Member States should verify that entities have 
provided appropriate evidence that adequate provisions have been or will be made to 
cover liabilities deriving from major accidents [13]. 
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Relevant authorities of the Member State ensured that early and effective public 
participation on the possible effects of planned offshore oil and gas operations on the 
environment. The public must informed and the groups that are concerned should be 
identified. Relevant information about planned operations and the right to participate in 
decision-making must be made available to the public. Also, reasonable time-frames 
shall be provided allowing sufficient time for each of the different stages of public 
participation (Article 5).  
Independent Competent Authority 
The new directive defines clear and detailed responsibilities to the regulators. Member 
states need to establish a single National Competent Authority (CA), to ensure 
independent and objective administration of operations.  According to article 8(1), these 
include the assessment and acceptance of reports on major hazards, overseeing 
compliance with the directive by the operators and owners, perform inspections, 
investigations and when needed, enforcement actions. It is the member state’s 
obligation to take the necessary steps in ensuring that the CA is able to carry out its 
functions and duties and provide the resources necessary recourses. Any kind of 
conflict of interest between regulatory functions of the CA and the regulatory functions 
related to the development and licensing of operations should be avoided to ensure 
objectivity and independence.  
We shall address that the Competent Authority has a role in advising other authorities or 
bodies including the licensing authority and cooperate with other Competent Authorities 
and attempt to raise standards. Member States without offshore operations are still 
expected to cooperate in emergency response with nearby Member States. 
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More, In respect of article 22 of the Directive, Member States are required to create a 
mechanism that allows for confidential reporting of safety and environmental concerns 
and maintains the anonymity of the individuals concerned [6]. 
In addition to this, the Competent Authority has the power to require improvements by 
the operators and to prohibit the continuation of operations of an installation, in case the 
requirements of the Directive are not fulfilled or there is a reasonable concern about the 
safety of operations or installations. This can be concluded by the outcome of an 
inspection, by changes to notifications or by the review of major hazards report. In the 
case the CA is convinced that the operator can no longer comply with the directive’s 
provisions, and then the licensee is called to propose a new operator as a replacement 
(Article 18). 
After having overviewed the theoretical background, we shall dedicate a Section where, 
through a case study on the Directive, we explore the practical consequences of the 
Implementation of the new instrument for the industry actors, where called to bring their 
operational system in line with the new legislation. 
 
6. Case study on Directive Implementation 
 
In this Section, our interest is shifted to the exam of a Case study of implementation of 
the Offshore Safety Directive.   
Our main goal is to assert the practical consequences of the introduction of the new 
legal frame in a specific fact pattern.  This study shall enrich our ability to explore the 
new rules to apply, discuss on points where rules have evolved, underline positive 
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points and addressing difficulties that the industry or Competent authorities may have to 
overcome as well as the challenges to face. 
Where choosing the fact pattern, which could stand as a test to evaluate the new legal 
instrument, we could confine to studying the introduction of the legislation in an area 
where no offshore activity has been launched yet, outside the provided legal frame.  
That would be the case for geographical areas such as Cyprus, where the EU law shall 
be enforced, in regard of the development of offshore industry; it is expected to apply 
even beyond EU boundaries and cover the activities of European undertakings involved 
into the exploration in North Africa, so as Egypt.  Equal fact pattern is reproduced in the 
Baltic countries, where the development of offshoring activities is expected.   
Nevertheless, we have privileged the study of a fact pattern where the offshore industry 
is already flowering.  Such a fact pattern has the merits of proposing an existent legal 
framework where rectifications and adjustments shall be made on the rules to apply.  
Therefore, the reader’s attention is drawn to those specific points where legislation is 
revised and practical consequences of this regulatory framework are pointed out.  More, 
the new challenges for the industry sector are brought to our knowledge. In addition, the 
institutionalized organization of supervisory and monitoring authorities is not dismissed 
from our study.  Having taken these elements into consideration, we have decided to 
assert the case study of a British undertaking operating in the North Sea.  Therefore, we 
have to exam the impact of this legal instrument on the UK offshore oil and gas industry. 
Our case study is based upon a presentation made public by the British department of 
Energy and Climate Change (HSE) explored by the direction of Diving and pipelines 
Policy [15]. 
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Consider a British controlled Oil Company is executing a contract of exploitation in the 
Norwegian Sea, which is applicable on the 20 of July 2015.   
The first element to take into consideration is that the British corporation needs to 
monitor its compliance duties and share information on the current reform on EU law, 
with the competent authorities.  Under the previous legal framework, the British 
corporation has as contact person, for the administrative monitoring, several authorities, 
quoting for the purposes of our case, principally the DECC and HSE, DfT, MCA, 
DEFRA.   
After the introduction of the new Directive, the British competent authorities, which are 
entailed with the data and reporting monitoring, redesign their organizing structure. 
From now on, the DECC works in partnership with HSE, under a memorandum 
understanding, where the setting of common competent authorities arrangements is 
determined.   
Consequently, the British Company needs to take knowledge of the new repartition of 
competences as defined under the Memorandum and readjust its own internal 
organizational structure, in order enhance an appropriate cooperation with its new 
counterparty.  Under the new design of the British Competent authorities, DECC/HSE 
Competent Authority Management Board, designed after the organizational modeling of 
onshore COMAH Competent authority, delivers decision- making steaming. 
Besides, the new repartition of competences between the two bodies has an impact on 
the security control inspection undertaken on the Company’s platforms.  Hence, the 
Corporation shall carefully study the new Memorandum to ensure that the controls 
operated are in line with the Memorandum. Under the new legal framework, a 
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presumption of join DECCS/HSE visit whenever appropriate is valid. However, an early 
decision as to which regulatory partner leads the inspection is expected. Moreover, the 
Corporation shall ensure that the controller exercises no excess of competence 
specifically, for example, he has no competence on “personal safety issues” [15]. 
The British Corporation shall be expecting to have a more business friendly 
environment where it comes to administrative compliance rules.  A new IT portal for all 
notifications and submissions related to the major hazard safety and environmental 
issues shall replace a disparity of portals.  The same holds true for a unique CA 
website, holding all CA guidance and procedures, and also a single enforcement model.  
What shall be underlined is that from now on, processes and procedures for accepting 
and assessing safety cases and notification and so on are all codified under a single set 
of Competent Authorities assessment, instead of the two offshore Approved Codes of 
Practice [16].   
A high importunacy revision of the current state of play for the British Corporation is 
related to its reporting obligations, as far as concerns the major hazards report and 
reporting major incidents.  Where preparing the major hazards report, they shall keep in 
mind that the definition of “major hazard “under the Directive does not coincides 
identically with the one known under the British legislation [14].  Where it comes to the 
drafting of the report, only a short summary on environmental information is required.  
Moreover, a new reporting obligation is introduced, for reporting major incidents within a 
delay of 24 hours after taking the action.  In addition to this, the reporting obligation of 
major accidents is extended to the worldwide operations of the Company [18].    
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The second element that attracts our interest is related to the revision of the licensing 
procedure.  Under the new regime, the Company shall prepare one emergency 
response plan that covers, both environmental and safety arrangements, set up after 
two plans, one submitted to the HSE, as has been the case until now and an amended 
plan for DECC which takes into consideration the additional environmental 
requirements.   
By additional environmental requirements, we basically refer to the amending of the 
Merchant Shipping Regulations of 1998, for extending its cover to new areas.  As 
Ashurst London details [4], the amended text shall “cover the decommissioning of 
offshore installations, extend to the owners of non-production installations, who will be 
required to submit an Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (OPEP) for their installations, 
include a requirement to undertake a full review and resubmission of an OPEP every 
five years; and include powers to prohibit operations where no OPEP is in place” [4].  
Besides, one major difference to be noticed is relevant to the amendment of the 
Environmental Liability Directive, where its territorial scope is extended to cover water 
damage to the marine waters of Member States, beyond the 12-mile zone. 
Tracking back to the licensing procedure, we shall remark that the British Corporation 
shall need to phase some new challenges.  The core issue is that licensees are liable 
for operations taking place in only licensed areas but still only the approved operator is 
liable for the operations conducted.  Financial requirements are introduced, where the 
operator shall provide evidence for having the capacity to cover liabilities as defined by 
the Directive.  Last but not least, the national Competent Authority has the right to 
initiate the revocation of operator’s approval if needed [17]. 
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A last point to notify regards the condition of accident incurring and the cooperation of 
the British Corporation with competent authorities.  The Company shall take into 
consideration that according to Preamble’s point (60), where accidents during offshore 
an oil and gas operation affect a Member State’s shores, no matter whether that State 
allows offshore oil and gas operations, still remains bound for providing prepared 
response and investigation to major accidents.  Therefore, the Member State affected 
shall respond appropriately and cooperate through contact points with other Member 
States concerned with relevant third countries.  Consequently, our Corporation shall 
expect the Member State having granted no license for its activity, to respond in case of 
accident and coordinate its communication with third countries if needed. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
 
The European Commission, back in 2012, having taken knowledge of the available data 
on the past offshore accidents, as delivered by the pooling of information collected by its 
Research Institute, has arrived to the conclusion that offshore accidents are not as 
extremely rare as we may have assumed.  “In particular, blowouts with severe 
consequences may not be as rare as initially thought. In depth investigation of these 
events is necessary” [26]. 
What the Commission attempts to achieve through its legislative proposal is 
summarized after its statement “to lower the risks of a major incident from occurring 
through best industry and regulatory practices. It also attempts to improve the response 
measures and liability provision to deal with a major emergency should the preventive 
measures fail; by improving and clarifying existing EU liability and compensation 
provision and implementing fully joint-up emergency response and preparedness in all 
EU offshore regions”. [30] 
In the author’s view, it shall be admitted that the European Commission successfully 
identifies those main problems that the Oil and gas offshore industry is currently facing.  
Nevertheless, the approach adopted for tackling these issues, as it has been described 
in this Paper, may call the reader to contemplate on further eventual improvements  
 A first observation stems from the Directive’s impact.  As it has been stated, “Together 
with the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, Norway lobbied hard and what eventually 
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passed as Directive 2013/30/EU was amended strongly such that those North Sea 
states (which make up 90 per cent of the EEA’s oil extraction) could essentially ignore 
it”[28]. This statement reveals the high skepticism the Directive’s approach has 
cultivated among the main actors of offshore industry in the EU. The latters, based upon 
their enriched experience on this topic, demonstrate reticence in regard of this legal 
instrument. 
As it has been demonstrated through the study of policy options explored by the 
Commission, the elaboration of a EU legal instrument where most of the objectives 
flagged would be obtained appeared as too much intrusive.  The EU, that has made 
some thoughts on setting up an EU Agency for ensuring its control in this sector, rapidly 
realized that such a scenario would not be politically feasible.  
The initial attempt of the EU, so as proceeding by regulation, which would applied to all 
Member States and Norway as well, could have ensure the centralizing control of 
offshore health and safety and environmental protection in Europe. Yet, by doing so, the 
“Commission recognised and applauded the extremely high safety standard of North 
Sea oil producing countries and in fact ‘cherry picked’ from the various regimes – 
particularly the UK – to produce the draft regulation. Its intent was to ensure that all of 
the other EU countries conducted offshore operations to the same standard”[29]. 
This approach was some how not convincing.  The British adressed that the new legal 
instrument was dismissing the “goal-setting” framework, that attests the improvement of 
UK law after the Piper Alpha Disaster, as endorsed by Cullen Inquiry view on the topic.  
The second ground of criticism arises from the unjustified addition administrative burden 
to be borne by Member States ((the UK, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway) where the 
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latter already have an existing regulation, embedding “gold standard” safety regimes, to 
be re-drafted with costs, for no good reason.  
A subsequent ground of discordance between the UK government/ Oil and Gas UK and 
the European Commission is linked to the timeframes of implementation of the new 
legal instrument.  The British defeated this schedule as “unrealistic”.  Since few 
countries have already implemented the Directive, this holds to some extend true.   
The main ground of dispute remains the evaluation of the quality of the normative rules 
proposed, contested for “poor drafting and a lack of interpretative guidance” [29] 
arguing, as long as no more certainty is obtained, confusion may persist and on going 
operations would face problems. 
On the overall, in my opinion, the adoption of the 2013 Directive is a positive step for the 
offshore safety.  It shall quite improve the system of those countries such as Italy, Spain 
and the Baltic States, other than the Nordic countries. 
Moreover, the Directive covers to a good extent the major hazards issue and deals with 
the major accident risk, providing for further improvement of the actual regime applied.  
The main contribution of this text is gaining greater transparency on the functional 
model of the industry and the operations accomplished by regulators.  The MAAP is an 
illustration of that, so as “the best practises” concept introduced.  The EU does not 
determine the rules the offshore industry shall respect but rather defines that the latters 
shall act according to the “best practices”.  Yet, Commission specifies with high 
precision in which areas this shall be the case, for matters related to Safety, health at 
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work.  We limit our drafting on quoting the reference of these points, so as Preamble 
points 14,18,25,26,29, 30,31,37,47 and articles 2§8, 19§7, 27§3 and Annex IV (2). 
The Oil and Safety Directive is therefore, a decisive step for enhancing our 
understanding and practices in this area, despite punctual insufficiencies and luckiness 
addressed. 
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